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The 20th century beheld a dramatic transformation of the family. Some
Kuznets style facts regarding structural change in the family are presented. Over
the course of the 20th century in the United States fertility declined, educational
attainment waxed, housework fell, leisure increased, jobs shifted from blue to
white collar, and marriage waned. These trends are also observed in the cross-
country data. A model is developed, and then calibrated, to address the trends
in the US data. The calibration procedure is closely connected to the underly-
ing economic logic. Three drivers of the great transition are considered: neutral
technological progress, skilled-biased technological change, and drops in the price
of labor-saving household durables.
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1 Beginning
In celebrated research Kuznets (1957) documented the structural change that an econ-
omy goes through as it grows. In particular, he showed that as an economy evolves there
is a shift in the distribution of output away from agriculture toward manufacturing and
after that a reallocation favoring services. Likewise, with economic development there
is initially a decline in the share of agriculture in aggregate employment with labor
being redirected into manufacturing and then eventually moving into services. Kuznets
(1957) examined both time trends within countries and as well as how the distributions
of output and employment varied across countries with their level of development.
The analysis here has two key objectives. First, it follows in the footsteps of Kuznets
(1957) by examining the structural change that the family goes through as an economy
develops. This is done both across time and countries. Facts are presented about: (1)
the decline in work effort, (2) the drop in fertility, (3) the waning in marriage, (4) the
descent in household size, (5) the rise in educational attainment, and (6) the shift from
blue- to white-collar jobs.
Second, a macroeconomic model of the family is developed and calibrated to see if it
can simultaneously explain the above set of facts. This is important because current
models of the family tend to focus on some subset of these facts, while ignoring the
complementary set. The calibration procedure shows how many of the parameters gov-
erning tastes and technology can be backed out to hit exactly a lot of the Kuznets
facts. This is done in an intuitive fashion by employing the first-order conditions, from
a household’s maximization problem, which regulates a Kuznets fact. Some causal
impulses underlying the great transition are examined; namely, neutral technological
progress, skilled-biased technological change, and process innovation in the produc-
tion of labor-saving household durables. Both neutral and skilled-biased technological
change are important for explaining the rise in living standards between 1880 and 2020.
Skilled-biased technological progress is the primary driver of the decline in fertility and
the rise in educational attainment. It induces a shift from having a large number of
uneducated children toward a smaller number of educated ones. Process innovation in
the production of household durables is the force underlying the decline in housework
and the fall in marriage.
A brief literature review is provided at the end. Since other literature reviews are
available, the review here is oriented toward providing references for the ingredients
used in the modeling analysis.
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2 Kuznets Facts for Family-Economists
Some key facts about the great transition that occurred in the household over the last
century are presented now. Data descriptions and sources are provided in the Data
Appendix A.
2.1 The Decline in Work Effort
There has been a dramatic decline in labor effort over the last two centuries, as Figure
2.1 shows. In 1830 the average full-time worker put in 69 hours of effort. This declined
to 39 hours by 2000. Historically speaking, it was mostly men that participated in the
labor market. They had a workweek of 63 hours in 1900 versus 44 hours in 2018. Over
time the labor-force participation rate for men has fallen. It was 97 percent in 1860
compared with 88 percent in 2018. By contrast, almost no women worked in 1860 (7
percent) while the majority did in 2018 (74 percent). The average workweek for women
was 40 hours in 1940 and declined slightly to 38 hours in 2018. While historically
women did not participate in the labor market as much as men, women did work in
the home. In particular, in 1900 they spent 58 hours a week on cleaning, cooking, and
laundry. This tumbled to just 11 hours by 2019, as Figure 2.2 illustrates.
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Figure 2.1: Average Weekly Hours and Labor-Force Participation in the United States.
Now, one might think that poor countries today might resemble the United States of the
past. If so, then there should be a negative relationship in a cross-section of countries
between per-capita income and average weekly market hours. Likewise, time spent in
housework should decline with per-capita income. It might be a bit wide-eyed to expect
that the cross-country relationship observed today would match up exactly with the
3
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Figure 2.2: Housework in the United States.
US historical time series (where time is replaced with per-capita income); because, even
the poorest countries today have appliances, computers, and machinery that were not
available in the American past. As can be seen from Figure 2.3, though, there is indeed
a negative relationship between (logged) per-capita GDP and average weekly hours.
The correlation coefficient between these two variables is -0.64. There is also a negative
correlation between cleaning and cooking, on the one hand, and per-capita GDP, on
the other. The correlation coefficients are -0.31 and -0.78, respectively.
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Figure 2.3: The Cross-Country Relationship between per-capita GDP and Hours
Worked, both in the Market and at Home.
As the need for household labor declined, due to appliances in the home, and as the
workplace became more favorable to women, caused by a shift from brain to brawn
associated with computerization and mechanization, there was an upswing in female
4
labor-force participation across the world. This can be gleaned from the left panel of
Figure 2.4. Per-capita GDP and female labor-force participation are positively related,
with a correlation coefficient of 0.48 between the two series. The waxing of female
labor-force participation is stronger than it appears in the scatter diagram. This is
because technological innovation at home and in the workplace hit various countries
at differing levels of GDP per capita thereby muddying per-capita GDP’s relationship
with female labor-force participation. Additionally, one would expect female labor-force
participation to peak and level off at some point in time. Then its relationship with
per-capita GDP would be flat. The right panel of Figure 2.4 shows the rise in female
labor-force participation over time for seven representative countries. As can be seen,
the trends follow the US pattern.
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Figure 2.4: The Cross-Country Rise in Female Labor-Force Participation, Ages 20-64.
Another manifestation of the decline in hours worked is the trend over the last century
toward retiring at earlier age. Sixty percent of 80-year-old men in the United States
still worked in 1850! This had fallen to just 6 percent by 2018, as Figure 2.5, left panel,
illustrates. Over the course of the last century there was a dramatic increase in the
fraction of men in retirement for every age group over 60. This stylized fact is also true
across the world. In the cross-country data (right panel) the fraction of men retired
after age 65 is positively related with GDP, as can be seen. A caveat is in order. As
life spans increase in the modern era people may choose to delay retirement. Some
evidence of this is seen in the US time series for the 60-to-65 and 65-to-70 age groups.
5
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Figure 2.5: The Trend Toward Earlier Retirement.
2.2 The Drop in Fertility
The track followed by fertility descended from 7.4 children per white woman in 1800,
to 4.2 in 1880, and then to 1.6 kids in 2018. The trend in the total fertility rate, shown
in Figure 2.6, was interrupted once by the baby boom, which occurred roughly between
1940 and 1971, with a peak of 3.6 kids in 1957. As can be seen, the secular decline in
fertility swamps the rise during the baby boom years. Fertility decreases as a country
becomes richer, as can be seen in Figure 2.7. The correlation coefficient between (the log
of) per-capita GDP and the total fertility rate (TFR) and is -0.75. The downward time
trend in the crude birth rate (CBR) for seven representative countries is also shown.
Mexico displays the classic
⋂
–shaped demographic transition, where fertility first rises
and then falls. At its peak in 1930 there were 49 births per 1,000 population. By 2016
this had dropped to 18. While the mid-twentieth century baby boom for the United
Kingdom is noticable, it is swamped by the secular decline.
6
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Figure 2.6: Fertility in the United States.
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Figure 2.7: The Cross-Country Decline in Fertility.
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2.3 The Waning in Marriage
In 1880 only 39 percent of women in the 20-to-29 age group had never been married;
direct attention to the left panel of Figure 2.8. This had jumped up to 76 percent by
2019. This was linked to an increase in the median age of marriage from 22 years in
1890 to 28 in 2019. As can be seen, around the baby boom years there was a burst
in marriage with an associated drop in the median age of marriage. The figure, right
panel, also tracks the composition of US households over time. The fraction of married
US households contracted continuously, especially married households with children.
Correspondingly, the fraction of households made up by singles grew significantly, with
a distinct rise in single households with children. The same patterns show up in the
cross-country data as well. The fraction of women ages 20 to 24 that are never married
rises with (the log of) real per-capita income. The correlation between the two series is
0.83–see Figure 2.9, left panel. So, does the mean age of marriage (right panel), with a
correlation coefficient of 0.80.
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Figure 2.8: Marriage in the United States.
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Figure 2.9: The Cross-Country Relationship between per-capita GDP and Marriage.
2.4 The Descent in Household Size
Associated with the drop in fertility and a rise in the number of singles has been a
descent in household size, both in the United States and across countries. In 1850 there
were roughly 5.4 people living in the average American household, compared with 2.5
in 2019. Across countries there is a negative association between per-capita GDP and
household size, with a correlation of -0.70–see Figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.10: Household Size in the United States and Across Countries.
2.5 The Waxing in Educational Attainment
A child born in 1876 would have had 7.7 years of schooling by age 35, while one born in
1975 would have had 14.2; see Figure 2.11. So, years of schooling roughly doubled over
9
the last century. In 1869 only 1.3 percent of individuals, ages 18 to 24, were enrolled
in an institution of higher education, while 57 percent were in 1995. Move on now
to the cross-country data and direct attention to Figure 2.12. Years of schooling rise
with a country’s level of per-capita GDP; the correlation coefficient is 0.85. Likewise,
the percentage of the population who completed a tertiary education moves up with
per-capita GDP, with a correlation of 0.71. So, the cross-country evidence is simpatico
with the US time-series evidence.
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Figure 2.11: Educational Attainment in the United States.
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Figure 2.12: The Cross-Country Relationship between per-capita GDP and Educational
Attainment.
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2.6 The Shift from Blue- to White-Collar Jobs
With the introduction of electricity and the internal combustion engine, the need for
physical labor declined. This led to a dramatic shift in labor force away from blue-
collar jobs toward white-collar ones for both men and women. This shift is displayed in
Figure 2.13. As can be seen, 88 percent of the male labor force labored in blue-collar
jobs in 1860. By 2018 this had dropped to 37 percent. The shift was even stronger
for women. Today only 10 percent of working women are in blue-collar jobs compared
with 87 percent in 1860. Not surprisingly, over the entire period there is a proclivity
of women relative to men to favor white-collar jobs over blue-collar ones. The same
trend is true in the cross-country data. As a country’s per-capita GDP rises so does
the fraction of the labor-force working in white-collar jobs. This is true for both men
and women; see Figure 2.14. Women are more likely to work in white-collar jobs than
men.
1 8 5 0 1 8 7 5 1 9 0 0 1 9 2 5 1 9 5 0 1 9 7 5 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 5
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Figure 2.13: Occupations in the United States for Men and Women.
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Figure 2.14: The Cross-Country Relationship between per-capita GDP and White-
Collar Jobs.
3 Setup
There are two types of households in the economy; namely, married and single. An
adult in a household lives for one period and has one unit of time. A single household
can split their unit of time between three uses: household production, h, leisure, l, and
toiling in the market, t ≡ 1− l−h. A married couple has two units of time. They must
devote some of this time to raising children, both for basic child care and educating
their kids. In terms of time, a child costs b in basic child care and e in education. So,
a married couple have five uses for their time: basic childcare for k ≥ 0 kids, or bk;
educating k children, ek; household production, h; leisure, l; and toiling in the market,
t ≡ 2 − bk − ek − h − l. An adult has one unit of raw talent that is divided between
brain and brawn. This split, s ∈ [0, 1], was decided earlier in life by the adult’s parents.
A unit of brain is paid v while a unit of brawn receives u. Brain is paid more than
brawn so that v > u. The market wage for a unit of labor, w = sv + (1− s)u, depends
on how a person’s skill endowment is split between brain and brawn.
Labor income is used to purchase market consumption, c, and household durables, d.
Market consumption is the numeraire good with a price of one. Durable goods, d, are
mixed with household labor, h, to produce nonmarket goods, n.1 The per-unit price of
a household durable is p.
At the beginning of adult life a single is matched with another single. At that point in
time, they draw a common joy shock for the relationship, j. The couple then decides
1Note that h can be different from h above.
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immediately whether to marry or not. In addition to marital joy, j, marriage offers
the possibility of children, k, as well as some scale economies from pooling resources.
The extent of the economies from pooling resources will be regulated by a household
equivalence scale, ε.
3.1 Household Production
Nonmarket goods, n, are produced in accordance with the following household produc-
tion function
n = [θdσ + (1− θ)hσ]1/σ ,with σ ≤ 1, (3.1)
where d represents the input of household durables in production and h denotes the
amount of household labor. For singles household labor is just the time they spend on
housework; i.e., h = h. For a married household h might include the physical labor of
children. Specifically, for a married household with k children let h = h + χk, where
χ represents the productivity of a child in housework. Historically, children did some
work in the home. As an economy develops the need for child labor diminishes. This
could transpire because better appliances lower the burden of housework. Additionally,
increased schooling reduced the time that a child could devote to housework. This is
represented here by a drop in the value for χ; i.e., χ is allowed to change over time.
Child labor operates to reduce the cost of children, which has implications for fertility.
The parameter σ plays an important role in the analysis. It controls the degree of
substitutability between durables and labor in household production. A high value for
σ implies that durables and labor can easily be substituted. In this situation household
durables are labor saving. So, a decline in the price of durables, p, will create a sub-
stitution of capital, d, for labor, h, in the home. The parameter θ denotes the share of
durables in household production; it plays a much lesser role in the analysis.
3.2 Cost of Children
Only married households have children. There are two costs of raising children, basic
child care and education. The time cost per kid for basic childcare is b. So, the cost
of basic childcare for k children is just bk. Each child has one unit of undeveloped
talent. Parents can choose how to split their child’s talent endowment between brain
and brawn. This determines a child’s future wage. Let s ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction that is
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allocated to brain. The time cost of educating a child, or e, is given by
e = γs. (3.2)
3.3 Tastes
Tastes for a single are distributed over their consumption of market goods, c, nonmarket











Here α, β, and 1 − α − β are the weights attached to the utilities from consumption,
nonmarket goods, and leisure. The exponents on these utility terms, or ρ, ν, and
λ, control the concavity of the utility terms. As will be seen, these exponents (or
inverse elasticities) are important for governing the rate of change over time in an
utility function’s arguments. The weights can be thought of as determining the level of
an argument for some baseline period.
For a married household tastes are defined over their consumption of market goods, c,
nonmarket goods, n, leisure, l, the number of children, k, and their children’s future
wage rate, sv + (1 − s)u. As can be seen, the future wage for a child depends on the














[sv + (1− s)u]1−ζ − 1
1− ζ
, (3.4)
where ε ∈ (0.5, 1.0) is a household equivalence scale. The household equivalence scale
converts total consumption into consumption per adult. When ε = 0.5 there are no
economies of scale in consumption. Alternatively, if ε = 1.0, then consumption is a
full public good. The weight on the utility from leisure for a married household, δ,
differs from a single one, 1 − α − β; it’s hard to know how the utility of husband and
wife should be aggregated in a household. When the utility terms for the number of
children, ψ(k1−κ − 1)/(1 − κ), and their skill level, ξ{[sv + (1− s)u]1−ζ − 1}/(1 − ζ),
are positive, this will add to the value of married life over single life.
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4 Decision Problems
The decision problems for married and single households are now cast. The choice to
either marry or remain single is then addressed.
4.1 Singles
The budget constraint for singles is
c+ pd = w(1− h− l), (4.1)
where the lefthand side represents the person’s expenditure on market consumption and
durables while the righthand side specifies their labor income. In the utility function
for a single (3.3) substitute out for market consumption, c, using the budget constraint
(4.1), and for nonmarket goods, n, using the household production function (3.1) while





[w(1− h− l)− pd]1−ρ − 1
1− ρ
+ β
[θdσ + (1− θ)hσ](1−ν)/σ − 1
1− ν






The variable S gives the maximal level of utility that a single can attain.
4.2 Married Couples
The budget constraint for married households reads
c+ pd = w (2− bk − γsk − h− l) . (4.3)
Their budget constraint is similar to the one for singles except that a married couple
has two units of time that now must also be used for basic child care, bk, and educating
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In formulating this problem c and n have been eliminated from (3.4) by using (4.3)
and (3.1) while noting that h = h + χk. The variable M gives the economic value of
marriage. The economic values of married and single lives, M and S, play important
roles in the marriage decision.
4.3 Married versus Single Life
A single is matched with another single at the beginning of adult life. Upon meeting
they draw a common joy shock, j. The value of married life is then given by M + j,
where the economic value of marriage, M , is defined by (4.4). The value of single life
is provided by S in (4.2). The joy shock, j ∈ R, is drawn from a Gumbel distribution,
G(j):







,with d > 0,
where a and d are the location and scale parameters and j̃ denotes a random draw for
j.
The decision to marry formulates as
Marry, if M + j ≥ S;
Single, if M + j < S.
The threshold level of joy, j∗, at which a person is indifferent between marriage and
single life is given by j∗ = S −M . Let m denote the fraction of the population who is
married. The fraction of the population who is single (or unmarried), 1− m, is
















Now, if the economic value of marriage exceeds the value of single life, so that M > S
and S−M < 0, then the threshold value for marriage, j∗, can be negative. This implies
that some people marry purely for economic reasons.
5 Calibrating the Model to US Data
Can the above model match the Kuznets facts discussed in Section 2? To address
this question, the analysis focuses on two periods; namely, 1880 and 2020. The set of
targeted facts is fertility, schooling, housework, market work, and the fraction of the
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population that is single (or equivalently married). In order to match the set of data
targets values must be assigned to the model’s various parameters. Some parameters
can be directly imposed from information that is available while others are selected to
maximize the fit of the model with respect to the data targets.
5.1 Data Targets
The elements in the set of data targets are enumerated now. Unless mentioned, all
definitions and sources for the data targets are provided in the Appendix A.
1. Fertility : The targets here are the total fertility rates for white women in 1880
and 2018. So the objective is to attain k1880 = 4.24 and k2020 = 1.64.
2. Market work: The average market workweek for a married household in 1880 is
taken to be 68.82 hours, while for 2020 it was 66.91 hours. The number for 2020
corresponds to total market work by a husband and wife ages 20 to 64, conditional
on one person being employed, as recorded in the American Community Survey
in 2019. While hours worked in the market declined over time for married men
they rose for married women resulting in the average workweek across both men
and women being stable. There are 112 non-sleeping hours per adult in a week so
a married household will have 2×112 = 224 hours. Thus, for a married household
the goal is to match tm,1880 = 2 × 68.82/224 and tm,2020 = 2 × 66.91/224–recall
that a married household has two units of time, whereas a single household has
one. The 1880 and 2020 targets for the average market workweek for a single
household are 40.26 and 33.83 hours. For 2020 the number is taken from the
American Community Survey and is the average over all singles ages 20 to 64
in 2019. Therefore, for a single household the targets are ts,1880 = 40.26/112
and ts,2020 = 33.83/112. To obtain the numbers for 1880 an inference is made.
Specifically, Vandenbroucke (2009) reports that the average workweek (across
both working married and single individuals) in 1880 was 60.7 hours. Therefore,
m1880×hrsm,1880 + (1 − m1880)×hrss,1880 = 60.7. Now, boldly assume that the
married-to-single ratio of market time was the same in 1880 as is documented for
1940 by the Census. (The earliest Census year for which hours-worked data is
available.) Then, one can write
hrss,1880 = 60.7÷ [m1880(hrsm,1940/hrss,1940) + (1−m1880)],
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and
hrsm,1880 = [60.7− (1−m1880)hrss,1880]/m1880,
where hrsm,1940/hrss,1940= 41.94/24.53. This calculation results in hrsm,1880 =
68.82 and hrss,1880 = 40.26.
3. Housework : Lebergott (1993) estimated that 58 hours a week was spent on
housework–cleaning, laundry, and meals–in 1900. Assume that this number rep-
resents total housework in 1900 by both husband and wife. This number is some-
what speculative but only 3 percent of households had electricity at this time. No
one had refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, and the like. Accord-
ing to Lebergott (1993), scrub boards were used to clean clothes by 98 percent
of households with only 1 percent using a commercial laundry. By 2019 the total
amount spent on housework, by both husband and wife ages 20 to 64, had declined
to 17.45 hours, according to the data recorded in the American Time Use Survey.
Given these facts set the targets for a married household to hm,1880 = 2× 58/224
and hm,2020 = 2× 17.45/224. Data from the American Time Use Survey suggests
that a single household (ages 20 to 64) spent 6.41 hours per week on housework in
2019. For 1880 a fearless assumption is made: suppose that the married-to-single
housework ratio was the same in 1880 as the average ratio between 1965 and 2019
as computed from the American Heritage Time Use Study and American Time
Use Survey.2 Consequently, hrss,1880 = 58 ÷ 2.80. Thus, the goal for singles is
hs,1880 = 20.73/112 and hs,2020 = 6.41/112.
4. Marriage: In 1880 the percentage of never-married women, age 20 to 29, was 38.8,
while by 2019 this number was 76.2 percent. Therefore, ideally m1880 = 0.388 and
m2020 = 0.762.
5. Schooling : The level of schooling is identified as the fraction of the population
that was working in white collar jobs. In 1880 the percentage of the ages 25-to-54
population in white-collar jobs was 16.82. This percentage was 76.54 in 2018. So
the schooling targets are s1880 = 0.1682 and s2020 = 0.7654.
5.2 Fitting Parameter Values
To see if the set of Kuznets facts can be matched, values must be assigned to the model’s
various parameters. This is done in three ways. First, some parameters are exogenously
2This time use data only goes back as far as 1965.
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imposed. Second, other parameters can be backed out from the first-order conditions
so that the model hits certain data targets for married households exactly. Third, the
remaining parameters are chosen to maximize the fit of the model with respect to some
remaining data targets for singles.
Assigning parameter values using direct information
Begin with the parameters that are exogenously imposed. These fall into 7 broad
categories that are discussed now.
1. Prices : Prices for the two periods need to be specified; namely the wage rate,
w1880 and w2020, the college premium defined as the ratio of the college to non-
college wage rate, q1880 ≡ v1880/u1880 and q2020 ≡ v2020/u2020, and the price of
durables, p1880 and p2020. In the analysis, the wage rate for 1880 is normalized to
one; i.e., set w1880 = 1. Over the period in question wages grew eleven fold, or
an average increase of about 1.7 percent per year. Therefore w2020 = 11.3w1880.
3
The college premium in 2020 is taken be to q2020 = 1.81. This value corresponds
to the income earned from graduating with a four-year college degree relative
to the income earned from graduating just from high school–median incomes for
males are used, taken from the Census’s Current Population Survey in 2018. In
the model’s steady-state equilibrium the aggregate real wage, w, is related to the
skilled and unskilled wage rates, v and u, as follows:
w = sv + (1− s)u. (5.1)
Therefore, given data on the average wage rate, w2020, the college premium, q2020,








Little is known about the value of the college premium in 1880, q1880, so this
will be a free parameter in the calibration exercise. A calibrated value for q1880
implies values for u1880 and v1880, given w1880 and s1880. The price of durables is
assumed to fall at about 5 percent a year, the number used by Greenwood et al
3For the period 1880 to 1988, the real wage data in Williamson (1995) is used while for 1989 to
2019 real wages are defined to be real compensation of employees divided by aggregate hours worked
as reported in FRED.
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(2016). So, p2020 = 1.05
−(2020−1880)p1880. The price for household durables in 1880
is normalized so that p1880 = 100.
2. Household production function: The following values are assigned to the param-
eters governing household production: θ = 0.206 and σ = 0.276. The value for
θ comes from McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997). The value for σ lies
between the numbers in Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) and Mc-
Grattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997). A discussion on the selection of σ is
deferred to Section 6.4. The fact that σ > 0 implies that durables and housework
are quite substitutable in household production. Therefore, process innovation
in the production of household durables, which lowers their price, will be labor











This equation states that the marginal rate of substitution of durables for time
in household production, as given by the lefthand side, must equal the time price
of durable, or the righthand side. The parameter σ regulates the response of the
durables/housework ratio in the home to a change in the time price of durables.
The elasticity of substitution between durables and housework is −1/(1 − σ),
which in absolute value is increasing in σ. So when 0 < σ < 1 there will be a
larger increase in the durables/housework ratio (or equivalently a decrease in the
housework/durables ratio) in response to a drop in the time price relative to a
Cobb-Douglas production function (σ = 0).
3. Coefficient of relative risk aversion: A standard value of 1.25 is chosen for the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ.
4. Household equivalence scale: The household equivalence scale is set to ε = 0.6667,
in line with the OECD’s modified scale. The scale assigns a value of 1 to the first
adult in family and a value of 0.5 to second one, which implies ε = 1/(1 + 0.5).
5. Basic childcare: The American Time Use Survey and Gershuny and Harms (2016)
are used to pin down the time cost of basic child care. Women spent on average
4.96 hours per week per child in basic child care in 2019, 3.93 hours in 1965,
and 1.22 in 1920. The average of these three values is selected for b; i.e., set
b = 2× 3.37/224. Here it is assumed that only women provide basic child care.
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6. Educating children: Given data on schooling, s, and the time spent educating
children by parents, e, an estimate can be obtained for γ. Specifically, γ =
s/e. As a measure of schooling the fraction of the labor force in white-collar
jobs is used. Now, 76.54 percent of the labor force was in white collar jobs in
2020. According the American Time Use survey a household spent 4.41 hours a
week then on educating a child. Thus, γ2020 = 0.77 × 2 × (4.41/224). Between
1960 and 1970, 57 percent of the labor force was in white-collar jobs. Data
from the American Heritage Time Use Study suggests that in 1965 the time
spent on educational activities per child was 1.31 hours per week. Therefore,
γ1965 = 0.57 × 2 × (1.31/224). Last, Gershuny and Harms (2016) report that
0.24 hours per week was spent educating a child in the 1920s. The fraction of
white-collar workers was 33.33 percent (an average between 1920 and 1930). So,
γ1920 = 0.33 × 2 × (0.24/224). An average of these three values is taken for γ.
This results in γ = 0.0261.
7. Child labor in home production: A child is not as productive as an adult in
household production. Wages can be used to gauge the productivity of children
vis a vis adults. The evidence suggests that the productivity of a child is much
less than that of an adult. For example, anecdotal evidence from Abbott (1908,
p. 28) is presented in Table 5.1. Lebergott (1964, pp. 49–50) relates that a
ten-year-old in 1798 could earn the equivalent of $22 a year working as a farm
laborer, as compared with $96 for an adult. So, how much housework did children
do? To answer this question, suppose that poorer countries today resemble the
United States in 1880. Webbink, Smits, and De Jong (2012) document children’s
housework across low-income countries (mostly African and Asian). The average
number of hours worked per week for boys and girls ages 8 to 13 was 6 and 9
hours. For 2020, the findings in Hofferth and Sandberg (2001) for the United
States are used. They document that children ages 0 to 12 spent 5.48 hours
per week in housework. Hence, χ1880 = (22/96) × 2 × (7.5/224) and χ2020 =
(22/96)× 2× (5.48/224).
Assigning parameter values using the first-order conditions–Inner loop
The rest of the parameters are fit with respect to a set of data targets. The calibration
procedure here has two loops: inner and outer. The inner loop picks the utility pa-
rameters governing a married household’s tastes over leisure, δ and λ, fertility, ψ and
κ, their children’s future earnings, ξ and ζ, and home goods, β and ν. This is done
21









based on observations for a married household’s leisure, fertility, educational choice for
children, and housework. When doing this the parameter values for the weight term on
a married household’s utility from consumption, α, and the 1880 college premium, q1880,
are taken as given. Note that a single household’s utility functions for consumption,
home goods, and leisure share the parameters α, ρ, β,ν, and λ.
The inner loop uses the first-order conditions for the married household to back out
parameter values so that the model fits exactly a married household’s data targets
for leisure, fertility, schooling, and housework. The exponents on the various utility
functions, λ, κ, ζ, and ν, are identified from the observed rates of change in the function’s
argument. The weights on the utility functions, δ, ψ, ξ, and β, are selected so that
the model fits the data for some particular year. The outer loop then picks the two
remaining parameters, α and q1880, to maximize the fit of the model over the time-
allocation data targets for singles. The choice of these two parameters influences the
determination of the inner loop’s parameter values. Last, the parameters governing the
Gumbel distribution are chosen to meet the targets concerning marriage.
Start now with the inner loop. To begin with, consider the married household’s choice
for leisure, l. The leisure first-order condition can be expressed as
δl−λ = αε1−ρ{w[2− bk − γsk − h− l]− pd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=c
}−ρw. (5.3)
The lefthand side is utility gain from an extra unit of leisure. The righthand side gives
the loss in utility from taking a unit of time away from market work. This results in a
loss of wages, and hence in consumption, of w. The loss in utility from a unit reduction
in consumption is just the marginal utility of consumption or αε1−ρc−ρ. When evaluated
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w2020 (2− bk2020 − γs2020k2020 − h2020 − l2020)− p2020d2020





It is clear that the change in leisure, l2020/l1880, is governed by the exponent on the utility
function for leisure, λ. So, conditional on values for the variables on the righthand
side, λ can be selected to match the desired change in leisure.4 The solution for λ
is dependent on the value for ρ that is set exogenously based on direct information.
The weight on the leisure utility function of married households, δ, can be obtained by
using the first-order condition for leisure to hit the leisure target for 2020 or to solve
the equation
δl−λ2020 = αε
1−ρ [w2020 (2− bk2020 − γs2020k2020 − h2020 − l2020)− p2020d2020]−ρw2020.
Next, move onto fertility, k, which has the efficiency condition
ψk−κ = δl−λ (b+ γs− χ) . (5.4)
The lefthand side is the marginal utility of a child. The righthand side is the marginal
cost in terms of the forgone leisure. An extra child costs b units of time in terms of
basic child care and γs in time spent on education. This time cost is offset by the
effective time the child spends in home production, χ. The net time cost is multiplied









b+ γs2020 − χ2020
b+ γs1880 − χ1880
.
As can be seen, κ is central for controlling the change in fertility, k2020/k1880. It can
be selected to match the targeted decline in fertility.5 The constant term on the utility
function for fertility is chosen so that the following equation is met
ψk−κ2020 = δl
−λ
2020[b+ γs2020 − χ2020].
4By taking logs of the above equation an explicit solution for λ in terms of the other variables
obtains.
5Again, by taking logs of the above equation an explicit solution for κ in terms of the other variables
can be obtained.
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Turn to schooling, s. The first-order condition for schooling can be written as
ξ [sv + (1− s)u]−ζ (v − u) = δl−λγk. (5.5)
The lefthand side gives the benefit to parents from investing in an extra unit of brain
for their children. This increases the adult child’s earnings by v−u, where the marginal
utility to the parents of an extra unit of earnings is ξ [sv + (1− s)u]−ξ. The righthand
side is the cost from an extra unit of brain. The time cost of the extra unit of brain
for k kids is γk, which could have been used for leisure. The marginal utility of leisure
is δl−λ. In this equation w = sv + (1 − s)u is the average wage in the economy, while
v − u can be thought of as representing the college premium. So, equation (5.5) can
be equivalently expressed in terms of the average wage, w, and the college premium,
q = v/u.6 When it holds at the data targets,[
s2020v2020 + (1− s2020)u2020












Contingent upon a value for λ, it’s clear that ζ, or the exponent in the utility function
for a child’s future wage, regulates the change in schooling over time. So, the value of
ζ that solves this equation is chosen. Recall that the college premium for 1880, q1880
that implies a value for v1880 − u1880, is determined in the outer loop. The weight term
in the utility function for a child’s future wage, ξ, can be nailed down from
ξ [s2020v2020 + (1− s2020)u2020]−ζ (v2020 − u2020) = δl−λ2020γk2020,
when assuming values for λ, δ, and ζ.
Finally, the first-order condition for a married household’s housework, h, reads
βε1−ρ(1− θ) [θdσ + (1− θ)(h + χk)σ](1−ν−σ)/σ (h+ χk)σ−1 = δl−λ. (5.6)
The lefthand side gives the benefit of an extra unit of labor in the home, while the
righthand side is the cost in terms of forgone leisure. It should be apparent by now
that the exponent on the utility term for home goods, ν, can be tied down by the
change in nonmarket goods,[
θdσ2020 + (1− θ) (h2020 + χ2020k2020)
σ












6Specifically, it is easy to calculate that v − u = w(q − 1)/(sq + 1− s).
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while β can determined by fitting the equation to some baseline year, specifically 1880,
so that





Assigning parameter values to maximize model fit–Outer loop
Turn now to the outer loop. The inner loop matches exactly the married household’s
data targets for fertility, schooling, housework, and market hours (hence leisure). The
outer loop helps the model match the targets for single households, in particular their
housework and market hours. The parameters α and q1880 are selected to get the best
fit possible for the model’s predictions about singles. Specifically, denote the i’th data
target by Di and the model’s solution for this target by Mi(α, q1880). The parameters










where each observation for singles is weighted uniformly. This minimization routine
takes into account how the choice of α and q1880 affects δ, λ, ψ, κ, ξ, ζ, β, and ν as de-
scribed above.
Finally, to match the marriage facts, recall that the maximization problems (4.2) and
(4.4) give values for single and married lives, S and M . Now, using equation (4.5), for
the fraction of the population that is unmarried, 1− m, it follows that
ln [− ln(1− m)] = −(S −M − a)/d.
If the above equation holds at the data targets, then
ln [− ln(1− m2020)]
ln [− ln(1− m1880)]
=
S2020 −M2020 − a
S1880 −M1880 − a
.
So, the location parameter for the Gumbel distribution, a, can be selected to hit the
change in the fraction of the population that is single. Given a, the scale parameter, d,
can be used to match the fraction of the population that is single in 2020 by employing
the equation
d = − S2020 −M2020 − a
ln [− ln(1− m2020)]
.
Values for the location and scale parameters are chosen after values for all the other
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parameters have been selected. The procedure here is akin to the matching strategy
employed in the inner loop.
5.3 Results
The parameter values resulting from the calibration procedure are displayed in Table
5.2. Table 5.3 presents the match between the data and model. The results are very
good. The above calibration procedure ensures that the model will match exactly
the time allocations for a married household. Fertility and schooling are matched
precisely too. It also guarantees the model’s fit for the marriage statistics is perfect.
The framework captures the fact that over time singles do less housework, cut back on
their market work, and enjoy more leisure. While the trends are correct, the levels for
these three variables are off a bit.
Table 5.2: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Identification
Market consumption
α, ρ Weight, exponent 0.157, 1.250 Eq (5.7), literature
Home goods consumption
β, ν Weight, exponent 0.054, 1.77 Eq (5.6)
Leisure
δ Weight, married 0.285 Eq (5.3)
1 − α− β Weight, single 0.789 Implied
λ Exponent 0.454 Eq (5.3)
Fertility
ψ, κ Weight, exponent 0.013, 0.517 Eq (5.4)
Schooling
ξ, ζ Weight, exponent 0.106, 1.635 Eq (5.5)
Home production technology
θ, σ Durables weight, exponent 0.206, 0.276 Literature, Sec 6.4
χ1880, χ2020 Child labor–productivity: 1880, 2020 0.015, 0.011 Data
Cost of Children
b, γ basic, education 0.030, 0.026 Data
Marriage, Gumbel
a, d location, shape -0.606, 0.032 Eq (4.5)
Prices
p1800, p2020,%∆p Durables: 1880 and 2020 levels, growth 100.000, 0.108, -5.000% Normalization, literature
w1800, w2020,%∆w Wages: 1880 and 2020 levels, growth 1.000, 11.300, 1.747% Normalization, data for %∆
q1880, q2020,%∆q Skill premium: 1880 and 2020 levels, growth 1.366, 1.810, 0.201% Eq (5.7), 2020 Data
Equivalence scale
ε Equivalence scale 0.667 OECD
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Table 5.3: Results, Data and Model
Variable Description Data Model
1880, 2020 1880, 2020
Fertility
k Fertility rate 4.240, 1.640 4.240, 1.640
Schooling
s Schooling 0.168, 0.765 0.168, 0.765
Time
h Housework (married) 0.518, 0.156 0.518, 0.156
Housework (single) 0.185, 0.057 0.253, 0.072
t Market work (married) 0.614, 0.597 0.614, 0.597
Market work (single) 0.360, 0.302 0.224, 0.216
l Leisure (married), implied 0.722, 1.165 0.722, 1.165
Leisure (single), implied 0.455, 0.641 0.523, 0.712
bk Child care 0.128, 0.049 0.128, 0.049
ek Educational care 0.019, 0.033 0.019, 0.033
Marriage
m Fraction married 0.612, 0.238 0.612, 0.238
1 −m Fraction single (unmarried) 0.388, 0.762 0.388, 0.762
6 Propelling the Great Transition
Attention is now directed to the driving forces behind the great transition. These are
the growth in the general level of wages, w, the fall in the price of household durables, p,
and the rise in the college premium, q. The driving forces underlying these endogenous
shifts in prices are various forms of technological progress; viz, neutral technological
advance, skill-biased technological change, and process innovation in the production of
labor-saving household durables. These three underlying exogenous forces are examined
in turn, which serves to illustrate the mechanisms at work.
To model this a production sector is appended onto the framework. To this end, suppose
that output, o, is produced according to a CES production function using unskilled and
skilled labor, u and v:
o = z[(1− ω)uι + ωxvι]1/ι, with ι ≤ 1. (6.1)
Here increases in z reflect neutral technological progress while shifts in x govern skilled-
biased technological change. Labor-saving household durables are produced according
to a linear production function where one unit of final output produces 1/p units of
durable goods. Thus, upward movements in 1/p, or equivalently drops in p, stand in
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for process innovation in the production of household durables.
A firm hires unskilled and skilled labor to maximize its profits or to solve the problem
max
u,v
{z[(1− ω)uι + ωxvι]1/ι − uu− vv}.
The first-order conditions from this problem state that the marginal products of un-
skilled and skilled labor equal the wages rates, u and v, for the two types of labor.
Thus,
z[(1− ω)uι + ωxvι]1/ι−1(1− ω)uι−1 = u,
and
z[(1− ω)uι + ωxvι]1/ι−1ωxvι−1 = v.










So the college premium is a function of the skilled-biased technology shift factor, x,
and the aggregate supplies of unskilled and skilled labors, u and v. Aggregate market
hours worked, t, is
t = mtm + (1−m)ts,
where m is the fraction of households that are married, tm is market hours worked by
a married household, and ts is hours worked by a single one. Accordingly, aggregate
hours of unskilled and skilled labor, u and v, are
u = (1− s)t
and
v = st.










To proceed estimates are needed for the skilled-biased and neutral technology factors,











From the baseline simulation values are known for m, s, tm, ts, u, and v for 1880 and
2020. This implies that values for t are also known for these two years. Given values
for ω and ι, the change in the college premium can be used to calibrate skilled-biased
technological change or x2020/x1880. Then, by using the college premium for one year,
a value for x for that year can be assigned from (6.2). Last, z1880 and z2020 can be
backed out by using (6.1). Values for ι and ω are needed to implement the procedure.
Acemoglu and Autor (2011, Table 8) estimate the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor for the 1963-2008 period. Their estimates suggest that ι lies
in the range [0.444, 0.661]. A value of 0.552, the average of their estimates, is selected
here. This implies an elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor of
-2.23. Additionally, from the constant terms in their regressions a range of values for
ω can be recovered. The average value of 0.439 is selected.
The upshot of the above procedure is presented in Table 6.1. The rise in x can be
thought of as reflecting a shift from brawn to brain as mechanization reduced the need
for physical labor. By tacking on a production sector in the above manner the base-
line equilibria for 1880 and 2020 can be retained untouched. The general equilibrium
analysis kicks in when perturbations from the baseline 2020 equilibrium are studied.
Specifically, neutral technological progress, skilled biased technological change, and pro-
cess innovation in the production of labor-saving household durables are each switched
off in isolation. The results are shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.1: Technology Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Identification
Market Production Function
ω, ι Weight on skilled labor, exponent 0.439, 0.552 Literature
Technology Factors
x1880,x2020,%∆x Skill biased: 1880 and 2020 levels, growth 0.852, 3.920, 1.096% Eq (6.2)
z1880, z2020,%∆z Neutral: 1880 and 2020 levels, growth 2.204, 4.157, 0.454% Eq (6.1)
p1880, p2020,%∆p Process Innovation: 1880 and 2020 levels, growth 100.000, 0.108, -5.000% Literature
6.1 Neutral Technological Progress, z
Neutral technological progress is shut down in the first experiment. To do this, let
∆z = 0, while keeping x and p at the values specified in the baseline calibration. Thus,
∆x > 0 and ∆p < 0. The college premium, q = v/u, can still change due to shifts in
factor supplies. The results of this experiment are reported in column 3 of Table 6.2.
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The salient feature of this experiment is that things don’t change dramatically from the
baseline 2020 calibration, except for living standards. Households are much poorer in
2020 relative to the baseline calibration, a fact reflected by the lower average real wage,
w, in 2020. This causes a large drop in market consumption, c, for both married and
single households. As a consequence the marginal benefit from working in the market
moves up–as can be gleaned from the righthand side of (5.3). All households work
more as a result so that t rises. Additionally, household purchase a smaller quantity of
durables, d. This leads to a drop in the consumption of home goods, n, which motivates
an increase in housework, h–the marginal benefit of housework or the lefthand side of
(5.6) rises. To compensate for the extra time spent on housework and in the market,
households cut back on leisure, l. Leisure is still considerably higher than its 1880 value.
For married households the drop in leisure raises the marginal cost of children relative
to the 2020 baseline–the righthand side of (5.4). This induces a drop in fertility, k,
compared with the baseline 2020 calibration. So the drop in fertility from 1880 is even
bigger now. Consequently, time spent on basic childcare, bk, is less now. Since married
households are having less kids it pays to educate them more so s rises–the righthand
side of (5.5) falls. That is, there is a substitution away from the quantity of children
toward the quality of children. Still, due to the drop in fertility, time spent on educating
kids, ek, falls from the baseline. The college premium, q = v/u, comes down as a result
of the increase in the level of skill.
Last, the benefit of marriage is larger relative to the 2020 baseline calibration as a
result of the declines in home goods, market goods, and leisure. So, m rises and s falls.
Hence, the drop in marriage from 1880 is smaller than in the 2020 baseline. The impact
on marriage relative to the 2020 baseline is relatively small because on the one hand
people are poorer, which is reflected in less consumption and leisure. This promotes
marriage. On the other hand, married couples have less kids and this raises the value of
single life vis a vis married life. Overall by comparing the results of this exercise with
the baseline calibration, it is apparent in this setup that neutral technological progress
is not the primary driver of the rise in leisure, the drop in fertility, the increase in
educational attainment, and the waning in marriage. It is an important force, however,
in the rise of living standards.
6.2 Skilled-Biased Technological Change, x
Skilled-biased technological progress is unplugged in the second experiment, so that
∆x = 0. Neutral technological progress and the price of durables behave as in the
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baseline model; i.e., ∆z > 0 and ∆p < 0. The big change here compared with the
2020 baseline calibration is that fertility, k, is much higher, and the fraction of the
population that is schooled, s, is significantly lower–see column 4 of Table 6.2. When
skilled-biased technological change is turned off, the reward from educating a child in
2020 drops–the righthand side of (5.5) falls because the college premium is lower. The
freed-up time from schooling kids goes into having more of them. As in the previous
experiment, households are much poorer now so they consume less, work more, reduce
spending on durables, do more housework, and have less leisure. The benefit of marriage
rises relative to the 2020 baseline model. The fact that people are poorer once again
encourages marriage. Fertility is higher but this positive effect on marriage is offset
by a decline in children’s educational attainment. By comparing the results of this
experiment with the baseline calibration, the upshot is that skilled-biased technological
progress is an important driver of the decline in fertility and the rise in educational
attainment. Other than a large fall in living standards, the effect on the other variables
is more moderate.
6.3 The Fall in the Price of Household Durables, p
To execute the third experiment process innovation in the production of labor-saving
household durables is turned off so that ∆p = 0, implying p2020 = p1880. The other
technology drivers, z and x, operate as in the baseline model; that is, ∆x > 0 and
∆z > 0. Again, wages, u, v, and w, may react in response to movements in labor
supplies. The main takeaway from this experiment is that the drop in the price of
labor-saving household durables is important for explaining the decline in housework
and the waning in marriage–Table 6.2, column 5. Household durables are now much
more expensive so people purchase less of them. This raises the benefit of working at
home–the lefthand side of (5.6). As consequence of the need to devote more time to
housework, time in 2020 is scarcer. There is a large drop in market work, t, relative to
the 2020 baseline, as well as a noticeable decline in leisure, l. The scarcity of time also
encourages a switch toward having fewer better educated kids. The benefit of marriage
jumps up because the difference in the utilities between marrieds and singles deriving
from leisure and the consumption of home goods widens. As a result the fraction of
households who decide to marry rises considerably–even higher than in 1880 due to
boost in utility from having better educated children.
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Table 6.2: Results, Experiments
Variable Description Data Baseline Model Fixed z Fixed x Fixed p
1 2 3 4 5
1880, 2020 1880 2020 2020 2020 2020
Fertility
k Fertility rate 4.240, 1.640 4.240 1.640 1.388 3.683 1.302
Schooling
s Schooling 0.168, 0.765 0.168 0.765 0.853 0.155 0.793
Time
h Housework (married) 0.518, 0.156 0.518 0.156 0.198 0.250 0.558
Housework (single) 0.185, 0.057 0.253 0.072 0.089 0.124 0.241
t Market work (married) 0.614, 0.597 0.614 0.597 0.638 0.710 0.443
Market work (single) 0.360, 0.302 0.224 0.216 0.231 0.261 0.157
l Leisure (married) 0.722, 1.165 0.722 1.165 1.092 0.915 0.933
Leisure (single) 0.455, 0.641 0.523 0.712 0.680 0.615 0.602
bk Child care 0.128, 0.049 0.128 0.049 0.042 0.111 0.039
ek Educational care 0.019, 0.033 0.019 0.033 0.031 0.015 0.027
Marriage
m Fraction married 0.612, 0.238 0.612 0.238 0.287 0.324 0.978
1 −m Fraction single (unmarried) 0.388, 0.762 0.388 0.762 0.713 0.676 0.022
Prices
w Average wage 1.000 11.300 6.207 1.877 11.450
q College premium, v/u 1.366 1.810 1.399 1.424 1.683
Goods
c Market goods (married) 0.599 4.957 2.999 1.080 4.623
Market goods (single) 0.217 1.692 1.031 0.382 1.609
d Stock of durables (married) 0.000 16.602 8.890 2.330 0.005
Stock of durables (single) 0.000 6.897 3.712 0.992 0.002
n Home goods (married) 0.278 0.791 0.668 0.498 0.315
Home goods (single) 0.121 0.329 0.279 0.212 0.133
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6.4 The Great Transition’s Transitions
The above results can be made even sharper by examining some quasi-transitions for
the model. Suppose that z, x, and p move along the following transition paths from
1880 to 2020:
zt = z1880e
∆z(t−1880), xt = x1880e
∆x(t−1880), and pt = p1880e
∆p(t−1880),
for t = 1880, · · · , 2020. Here ∆z > 0, ∆x > 0, and ∆p < 0 are the net rates of change in
these variables as reported in Table 6.1.7 For each period from 1880 to 2020 the model
is run under four scenarios: (1) A baseline scenario where all technology factors are
operational, (2) an experiment where just changes in z are shut down, (3) a situation
where x alone is unplugged, and (4) a case where p is held fixed in isolation. The
word “quasi” is used because in each period parents neglect to take into account that
prices will be different in the subsequent period; i.e., they are myopic. Think about the
experiments as running a series of steady states.
Figure 6.1 shows the transitional dynamics for fertility and schooling. It is immediately
obvious that without skilled-biased technological change (the Fixed x lines) fertility
would rise and schooling fall. When either z or p are shutdown fertility still drops and
educational attainment picks up. For these two cases the deviations from the baseline
time path are modest.
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Figure 6.1: Transitional Dynamics–Fertility and Schooling.
The transitional dynamics for a married household’s time allocations are displayed in




Figure 6.2. The time paths for single households (not shown) tell the same story.
Focus on the lefthand panel. Clearly, process innovation in the production of labor-
saving household durables is responsible for the decline in housework (the Fixed p
line). Without this, housework actually rises a little. As a married household becomes
richer they would like to consume more nonmarket goods, which requires either working
more in the home or buying more labor-saving durables. The latter are still very
expensive though. The impact of neutral technological progress, z, or skilled-biased
technological change, x, on housework is slight. The middle panel demonstrates that
process innovation in the production of labor-saving household durables is also very
important for market work. Without this there is a dramatic decline in market work. As
living standards improve due to increases in z and x households demand more leisure–
see the right panel. But, without technological progress in the home this requires
cutting back on market work. When either the neutral or skilled-biased technology
factors are switched off households are much poorer. To make up for this, they must
work more in the market relative relative to the baseline picture, as the middle panel
illustrates–the Fixed z and x lines. As a consequence, the rise in leisure falls short of
the baseline scenario–right panel.
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Figure 6.2: Transitional Dynamics–Housework, Market Work, and Leisure.
The next two plots are for marriage, which are presented in Figure 6.3. Start with
the left panel. The primary driver of the decline in marriage is process innovation in
the production of labor-saving household durables–as the Fixed p line demonstrates.
The impact of z and x on marriage is negligible. When there is no decline in the
price of durables married households fare better relative to single ones because their
consumption of home goods and leisure isn’t squeezed as much. Move to the right
panel. In the US data marriage shows a ∩-shaped pattern over time. To replicate this
pattern, the parameter σ, governing the degree of substitutability between durables
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and housework in the home production function, is chosen so that the model matches
as close as possible the fraction of the US population that was married in 1960.8 As
reported in Table 5.2, the resulting value for σ is 0.276. What explains the ∩ shape?
The utility benefit of marriage derived from the increased schooling for children climbs
over time. So, early on there are gains from marriage. But this utility benefit from
schooling children is eventually eroded away as the hike in labor-saving durables implies
that the utility in single life derived from home goods, leisure, and market goods rises
relative to married life and comes to dominate in the later years.9
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Figure 6.3: Transitional Dynamics–Marriage.
Finally, Figure 6.4 illustrates how the model’s prediction for fertility and schooling fare.
Take fertility first, which is shown in the left panel. Abstracting from the baby boom,
the model does well matching the secular decline in fertility displayed in the US data.
The model also goes a good job matching the rise in schooling.
7 Ending
A great transition in family structure occurred during the last century, both in the
United States and the rest of the world. Family size became smaller as fertility dropped
8To compute σ another loop is added outside of the previous two loops in the calibration strategy
described in Section 5. This outer loop minimizes the difference between the model’s implied married
population in 1960 and its data counterpart. The parameters values that are not assigned on the basis
of direct information are functions of σ. So too are the sequences for xt and zt. The sequences for χt
and pt are exogenous.
9The word relative is important as the utility from home goods, leisure, and market goods rises
over the course of the century for both types of households.
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Figure 6.4: Fertility and Schooling, again–US Data and Model.
and marriage declined. Educational attainment rose. The burden of housework eased
tremendously. People enjoyed much more leisure than in past. A macroeconomic model
is advanced and calibrated to see if it can explain this set of facts for the United States.
It can. The calibration strategy employed is closely linked with the economic intuition
arising from the model. In particular, the exponents on the utility functions for leisure,
nonmarket goods, the number of kids, and their future earnings, govern the rates of
change in leisure, housework, fertility, and education, whereas the weights determine
the levels for these variables in some baseline year. There may of course be other
frameworks, and calibrations, that can explain the same set of facts. A virtue of the
current setup is that it is parsimonious, yet rich enough the explain the great transition.
Only time will reveal the best modeling strategy.
What forces propelled the great transition? Three candidates are considered here;
namely, neutral technological progress, skilled-biased technological change, and process
innovation that lowered the price of labor-saving household durables. Quantitative anal-
ysis suggests that skilled-biased technological change, reflecting a shift from brawn to
brain, was instrumental in explaining the decline in fertility and the rise in educational
attainment. This encouraged married households to have fewer, but more educated,
kids. Process innovation that lowered the price of labor-saving household durables was
key for deciphering both the decline in housework and marriage. Last, while neutral




The father of family economics was Gary S. Becker. A compilation of his work is
contained in Becker (1991). For an elementary introduction to family economics see
Greenwood (2019). This book emphasizes how technological progress has affected the
family. It follows in the footsteps of a prescient monograph in sociology by Ogburn
and Nimkoff (1955). Two surveys on family economics from a macroeconomic perspec-
tive are Doepke and Tertilt (2016) and Greenwood, Guner, and Vandenbroucke (2017).
Time use is discussed in Aguiar and Hurst (2016). Chiappori (2020) reviews the em-
pirical and theoretical literature on marriage. Currently there are no surveys of the
macroeconomics literature on education. Goldin and Katz (2006) provide a twentieth
century history on education and wages in the United States. Some references to the
macro literature on education are provided below. Taken together these sources provide
extensive literature reviews. So only research that is directly related to the analysis
here is discussed.
As wages rose the average workweek in the market declined, as Figures 2.1 and 2.3
exhibit. An elementary discussion of the long-run trend in hours worked is contained
in Greenwood and Vandenbroucke (2008). They emphasize three mechanisms that
have an effect on hours worked: real wages, leisure goods, and time-saving appliances.
Quantitative explorations of the first two forces are Vandenbroucke (2009) and Kopytov,
Roussanov, and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2020). The trend toward earlier retirement,
presented in Figure 2.5, is analyzed in Kopecky (2011) who models the impact of
rising real wages and falling prices of leisure goods. The rise in female labor-force
participation and the decline in housework is the subject of Greenwood, Seshadri, and
Yorukoglu (2005); see Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. Their analysis builds on the
household production frameworks of Becker (1965) and Reid (1934). The idea is that
household appliances liberated women from the home and allowed them to enter the
workplace.
The mechanism adopted here for fertility has its roots in Razin and Ben-Zion (1975).
In their analysis children are a good that enters the utility function. Their device is
modified along the lines of Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005, Section
IV) to incorporate parental investment in children. This has the flavor of the famous
Becker and Lewis (1973) tradeoff between the quality and quantity of children, but
the brain versus brawn interpretation follows Galor and Weil (1996). Galor and Weil
(1996) discuss how capital accumulation leads to a shift away from brawn toward brain
in the labor market, which raises women’s wages more than men’s. Fertility declines
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as a consequence. Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005) model the secular
decline in fertility as well as the baby boom; recall Figure 2.6. The notion is that
the long-run decline in fertility resulted from an increase in wages, which escalated
the cost of having children. The baby boom resulted from technological progress in
household sector that reduced the cost of kids. Delventhal, Fernandez-Villaverde and
Guner (2021) study demographic transitions across the world since the middle of the
18th century. The rise in skill premium is the key driver of decline in fertility in their
analysis.
The framework for marriage is adopted from Greenwood and Guner (2009), which was
proceeded by Mortensen’s (1988) prototype model of marriage. The Greenwood and
Guner (2009) framework again incorporates the notion of household production à la
Becker (1965) and Reid (1934). The hypothesis is that technological progress in the
home and rising living standards reduced the need for household labor. This raised
the value of single life relative to marriage. Their analysis also addresses the transient
decline in the fraction of the never-married population around World War II; i.e., the ∪-
shaped pattern shown in Figure 2.8. This is done by incorporating a decision for young
adults to leave home. At first rising incomes and technological advance in the economy
allowed young adults to leave their parent’s home through marriage. As economic
development continued they could afford to leave home and live alone before getting
married. The framework predicts that household size should decline with economic
development, a fact displayed in Figure 2.10. The decline in household size is also
modelled in Salcedo, Schoellman, and Tertilt (2012).
The modern theory of education starts with Ben-Porath (1967). Often people interpret
the full time spent on training at the beginning of life in his model as schooling. An
important antecedent of Ben-Porath (1967) is Mincer (1958). The brain versus brawn
framework adopted here, which can be used to explain the trends in occupational
choice illustrated by Figures 2.13 and 2.14, can be thought of as a descendant of Ben-
Porath (1967). The brain versus brawn framework is operationalized in the current work
via skilled-biased technological change. A modern quantitative model of schooling in
the United States is provided in Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2014), which contains
references to the literature–see also the work by Castro and Coen-Pirani (2016) that is
similar in some ways. Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2014) is in the spirit of Kuznets
(1957). They try to explain both the cross-sectional and time-series facts regarding
educational attainment shown in Figures 2.11 and 2.12, as well as the patterns of
average hours worked displayed in Figures 2.1 and 2.3. In their analysis schooling
enters the utility function, as it does here. As incomes rise so do the demands for
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education and leisure. Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2010) and Manuelli and
Seshadri (2014) focus on trying to explain cross-country facts surrounding education,
especially differences in country’s incomes.
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• Figure 2.1 (average weekly hours and labor-force participation in the United
States): The source for average weekly hours, “All”, is Vandenboucke (2009,
Figure 1). This series covers the period 1830 to 2000. Prior to 1940, the data
covers all workers and after that it refers to workers ages 15 and above. The series
for men between 1900 and 1930 is also from Vandenbroucke (2009, Figure 1) and
is spliced together with US Census data for the subsequent years. The numbers
for men and women from 1940 to 2018 correspond to the 20-64 age group (con-
ditional on being employed and reporting positive hours) and are taken from the
US Decennial Censuses, 1940–2000, and the American Community Survey (ACS)
after that. The labor-force participation numbers derive from the US Decennial
Censuses, 1860–2000, and the ACS thereafter. They refer to individuals ages 20 to
64. Both series taken from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)
and exclude households with institutionalized individuals. Only household heads
and spouses are considered. The series are weighted means.
• Figure 2.2 (housework in the United States): The source for the data on housework
(cleaning, cooking, and laundry) from 1900 to 1926 is Lebergott (1993, Table 8.1).
Lebergott’s number of 58 hours per of housework in 1900 is somewhat speculative.
Articles in women’s magazines, such as Ladies Home Journal in 1920, suggested
a similar number–see Greenwood (2019, p. 51). Lebergott’s figure of 36 hours
for 1925-1927 is close to the Gershuny and Harms (2017, Figure 1) estimate
of 37 hours. In fact, if one adds in time spent knitting, mending, and sewing
the Gershuny and Harms (2016) number rises to 43 hours. The numbers for
1965 to 2019 represent core nonmarket work (cleaning, cooking, laundry, and
maintenance) for women ages 20 to 64. The data is taken from the American
Heritage Time Use Survey (up to 1993) and from the American Time Use Survey
(since 2003), available through the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. It excludes
students and retirees, and all individuals who do not report their gender, age, or
education level, as well as those whose total weekly hours are different than 168
hours per week (or 24 hours per day).
• Figure 2.3 (the cross-country relationship between per-capita GDP and hours
worked, both in the market and at home): The hours worked data for 46 countries
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is taken from Bick et al. (2018, Figure 1), where each country has a single
observation within a few years from 2005. The source for the data on hours
spent cleaning and cooking is Bridgman et al. (2018, Figure 9). They focused on
54 countries; different countries had a different set of years for the observations
spanning from 1974 to 2012. Bick et al. (2018) use real GDP per capita for the
same years as hours worked. GDP per capita is measured in US$2011 (expenditure
side in PPP terms from the Penn World Tables). Bridgman et al. (2018) utilize
real GDP per capita measured in US$1990 for various years (in PPP terms from
the Conference Board). This explains the difference in the horizontal axes.
• Figure 2.4 (the cross-country rise in female labor-force participation): The data
pertains to women in the 20-to-64 age group. The numbers for female labor-force
participation are taken from the OECD’s Labor Force Statistics while those for
per-capita GDP, measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) international $2017,
come from The World Bank. The scatter diagram shows the relationship between
per-capita GDP and female labor-force participation for 50 countries for the years
1990 to 2019; some early years are missing for some countries. The time-series
graph plots the data for Australia (1966-2019), Germany (1970-2019), Ireland
(1971, 1975, 1977, 1981, 1983-2019), Italy (1970-2019), South Korea (1980-2019),
Mexico (1991-2019), and Spain (1972-2019).
• Figure 2.5 (the trend toward earlier retirement): All numbers pertain to men.
For the United States retirement for each age group is defined as not being in the
labor force. The American data spans the years 1850 to 2018. The source for the
1850-2000 period is the US Decennial Censuses and the source for the 2001-2018
period is the ACS, all taken from IPUMS. The cross-country retirement data is
for men age 65+ across 186 countries and comes from the International Labor
Organization (ILO), Labor Force Participation by Sex and Age. GDP per capita
is taken from The World Bank and is measured in purchasing power parity terms
in international $2017. The range of years plotted for each country differs but lies
somewhere between 1990 and 2020.
• Figure 2.6 (fertility in the United States): The numbers refer to the total fertility
rate for white women. For 1800 to 1990 the data are from the Historical Statistics
of the United States: Millennial Addition, Series Ab63. For the years 1991 to 2015,
the data come from Martin et al. (2017, Table 4, p.21; and 2019, Table 2, p. 13).
• Figure 2.7 (the cross-country decline in fertility): Here the relationship between
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real per-capita GDP (logged) and the total fertility rate is shown for 185 countries
for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. The set of years varies across
countries. The source for the data on the total fertility rate is the United Nations,
World Fertility Data 2019. Real per-capita GDP is taken from The World Bank,
and is measured in PPP terms in international $2011. The times series decline
in the crude birth rate is plotted for Argentina (1862-2016), Iran (1953-2016),
South Korea (1953-2016), Mexico (1895-2016), Portugal (1886-2016), Thailand
(1953-2016), and the United Kingdom (1850-2016). The data was collected by
Delventhal, Fernandez-Villaverde, and Guner (2021), who report the underlying
sources.
• Figure 2.8 (marriage in the United States): The source for the data on the frac-
tion of the female population, ages 20 to 29, that was never married is the U.S.
Decennial Census for the years 1880 to 2000. The data for 2001-2019 is based
on the ACS.The calculation excludes individuals who are separated, divorced, or
widowed. The median age at first marriage, for the period 1880 to 2019, is har-
vested from the United States Census Bureau’s Historical Marital Status Tables,
Table MS-2. The source for the data on living arrangements is the US Decen-
nial Censuses, 1900–2000, and from the ACS, for 2010 and 2019. The “Other”
category refers to households with unrelated individuals living together.
• Figure 2.9 (the cross-country relationship between GDP and marriage): The facts
for marriage are plotted for 196 countries from 1990 to 2019; the set of years varies
across countries. The fraction of women ages 20 to 24 that were never married and
the mean age at marriage at first marriage are taken from the United Nations,
World Marriage Data (2019). The source for the real GDP per capita is The
World Bank, measured in PPP terms (international $2011).
• Figure 2.10 (household size in the United States and across countries): The US
data spanning 1850 to 1950 is sourced from the Historical Statistics of the United
States: Millennial Edition (Series Ae79 and Ae85). From 1960 to 2019 the data
is contained in the U.S. Census Bureau’s Historical Household Tables (Table HH-
4). The cross-country data is for 151 countries, where each country has a set of
observations for some years between 1990 and 2018. It comes from the United
Nations, Household Size and Composition Database. Real per-capita GDP is
taken from The World Bank, measured in PPP terms (in international $2011).
• Figure 2.11 (educational attainment in the United States): The data on years of
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schooling for whites at age 35, by birth cohorts from 1876 to 1975, is from Goldin
and Katz (2008, Figure 1.4). Enrollment in institutions of higher education as a
percentage of the 18-to-24 year old population, for the years 1869-1995, is provided
in Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition (Series Bc524).
• Figure 2.12 (the cross-country relationship between GDP and educational attain-
ment): The data is for 112 countries, where a country reports some subset of years
in the set {1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010}. The source for the data on years of
schooling and completed tertiary education is Lee and Lee (2016). Real GDP per
capita, measured in PPP terms (in international $2017), comes from The World
Bank.
• Figure 2.13 (occupations in the United States): The data spans the period 1860
to 2018. It shows the percentage of the labor force for each gender, ages 18 to
64, working in blue- and white-collar jobs. The source for the 1850-2000 pe-
riod is the US Decennial Censuses and the source for the 2001-2018 period is
the ACS, all taken from IPUMS. White-collar jobs comprise the managerial and
professional specialty occupations as well as the technical, sales, and administra-
tive support occupations. Blue-collar jobs comprise the services occupations, the
farming, forestry, and fishing occupations, the precision production, craft, and re-
pair occupations, and the operators, fabricators, and laborers occupations. This
classification follows the ILO’s ISCO categories.
• Figure 2.14 (the cross-country relationship between per-capita GDP and white-
collar jobs): The data covers 186 countries for years 2010 to 2018. Not all countries
had the data for all years. The data on white-collar jobs as a percentage of all jobs
for a given gender is reaped from the ILO, Employment by Sex and Occupation.
GDP per capita is measured in PPP terms (in international $2017) is taken from
The World Bank.
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